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PROTECTING THE EQUIPMENT LESSEE FROM
THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
LESSOR'S BANKRUPTCY
Thomas R. Suher*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the coming year, many corporations, government agencies, and
institutions such as universities and hospitals will be leasing much of
the equipment they need to perform and support their functions. This
leased equipment will include heavy transport vehicles, airplanes, industrial machinery, business equipment and, most frequently,
sophisticated and expensive computer equipment. The primary reasons
for deciding to lease rather than purchase are the opportunity to obtain the lowest cost of funds for financing the equipment acquisition,
the undesirability of making or inability to afford a substantial capital
investment, the ability to take advantage of the benefits of the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation which may flow to the
lessor (and which may not be directly available to the lessee because of
its tax position) and then indirectly to the lessee in the form of lower
rentals, and a number of other more complex tax and accounting advantages. '
There are, of course, certain potential economic disadvantages to
leasing as compared to purchasing. The lessee is obligated to pay rental
for the equipment for the entire term of the lease even if the use of the
equipment is no longer necessary or the equipment becomes obsolete.
The lessee may be able to protect itself to some degree from this eventuality if it negotiates a right to terminate the lease during the term.
However, this protection may be limited in that there will probably be
either a substantial charge owed the lessor upon termination or the
lease rentals will be higher to compensate for the lessee's obtaining a
termination right. If the equipment, rather than becoming obsolete,
maintains or increases in market value, the lessee will not realize the
appreciation which it would have realized as owner. The lessee,
however, should be as secure as a purchaser in its use and possession
*Attorney, Western Electric Corporation. B.A. Amherst College, 1971; J.D.,
University of North Carolina School of Law, 1974. The author would like to thank
Frederick K. Wallach, Esq., who raised several of the important questions and issues
discussed in this article.
1.
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REISMAN, EQUIPMENT LEASING - LEVERAGED LEASING

4-7, 73-84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REISMAN].
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of the equipment during the lease term, providing the lessee makes its

rental payments.'
One unavoidable difference, however, in the degree of security on

the part of the lessee, as compared to a purchaser, is the right of the
trustee of a bankrupt lessor to reject the lease or at least the executory
covenants of the lessor. This is a problem of considerable complexity
which has not, in the context of personal as opposed to real property
leasing, been effectively addressed by the courts, statutes or legal commentators.3 By contrast, the consequences of a landlord's bankruptcy
on a lease of real property and the trustee's right to reject the lease or
executory convenants have been the subject of a number of thoughtful
and perceptive articles, 4 the focus of a number of cases and, most importantly, have been specifically dealt with in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.1
The articles point out the difficulty of the lessee's problem and the
lack of guidance and certainty for the legal advisor in the area of real
property. This problem is even more acute when a lease of personal
property is at issue, particularly in light of the failure of the new
bankruptcy act to address the matter.
There are basically two types of equipment lease transactions - the
6
operating lease and the finance or leveraged lease. In the operating
lease, the lessor is usually the equipment manufacturer, the lease is
2. After outlining the possible disadvantages and risks of leasing, Travis F. Epes
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court decisions which will be discussed at greater length in this article. See, e.g., In re
DEC.
Bermec, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Olin of New York, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT.
(CCR) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
in
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Bankruptcy, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. &
cy: A Proposal for Treatment of the Lease by Reference to its Component Elements,
54 B.U.L.R. Ev. 903 (1974); Jacobson, Lessor's Bankruptcy: The Draftman's
Response to the Tenant's Plight, 1 REAL PROP. L.J. 152 (1972); Creedon, supra note
3
3; Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization,
U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1964).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101).
6. These terms, although commonly used in leasing and business parlance, are
of art. As will be seen, although the operating lease and the finance lease are
terms
not
generally recognized as having certain attributes, the terms do not comprehend precise
or fixed elements.
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normally of short duration, and the lessor will usually have responsibility for maintenance, repair, taxes, risk of loss and insurance. The
rental will be based on the fair market rental value of the equipment.
The risk of the lessor's bankruptcy in this type of lease should be a
matter of concern to the lessee for reasons that will be addressed shortly. However, as will also be pointed out, the lessee in an operating
lease can usually protect itself during the negotiation and drafting of
the lease against the worst consequences of the lessor's potential
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the possibility of the lessor's bankruptcy,
while certainly not to be ignored, is less substantial in that the
operating lessor is usually a substantial industrial entity with large
capital assets.
In a finance or leveraged lease, the lessor is usually a leasing company which purchases the equipment directly from the manufacturer
and leases it to the user-lessee. Alternatively, the user may purchase the
equipment from the manufacturer and sell it to the leasing company
which, in turn, leases it back to the user. The reason for such a
purchase-sale-leaseback arrangement is to realize certain rental credits
or price discounts available only to the user. The leasing company is
typically only in the business of equipment leasing, its main assets being its lease portfolio. In other situations, it functions as a broker,
transferring title to an equity investor and placing the debt represented
by the lease with a commercial lending institution.
The lessor's or owner's equity7 in the leased property is usually
limited to twenty percent, the remainder of the cost of the leased
equipment being financed by a lending institution which is assigned the
lease as security. The lessee's rental payments are usually made directly
to the lender-assignee without right of offset. The assignment will normally be effected by a Consent to Assignment agreement between the
lessee and the assignee in which the assignee agrees not to disturb the
lessee's right to use and possession of the leased equipment in return
for the lessee's unconditional and absolute obligation to pay the full
rental to the assignee regardless of any breach or non-performance by
the lessor or right to offset or deduction which the lessee might have
against the lessor. The advantages to the lessor are the benefits of the
investment tax credit and depreciation deduction based on the full ac7. The distinction between a finance and a leveraged lease, while not significant
to the issue of the lessor's bankruptcy, is that in a finance lease, the lessor of the equipment will likely remain its own subject of course to the interest of the lender to whom
the lease and a security interest in the eqiupment is assigned. In a leveraged lease, the
original lessor will sell the equipment to an equity investor which will obtain the tax advantages of full ownership. In the latter case, the lessor will usually remain obligated to
perform the covenants of the lease.
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quisition cost of the equipment and the residual value of the equipment upon expiration of the term of the lease.
Generally, the finance lease will be a net lease with most of the
obligations relating' to the use of the equipment, including
maintenance, insurance, and taxes being the direct responsibility of the
lessee or, if not, paid indirectly by the lessee either as an addition to
the rent or as a reimbursement to the lessor. The lessor, however, may
retain the risk of loss obligation to replace the equipment with the proceeds from the insurance paid for by the lessee and the responsibility to
pay property taxes. The lessor will also normally have the obligation to
lease additional equipment or upgrades in the case of computers. In
addition, the lessor will usually give the lessee options to extend or
renew the lease and often the option to purchase the equipment during
the term or upon expiration of the lease.
II.

THE BANKRUPTCY LAW.

The issue of the lessor's bankruptcy and, specifically, the power of
the trustee of the bankrupt lessor to reject the lease, or certain executory convenants contained in the lease, will be examined in light of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.8 The 1978 Act provides the
trustee with essentially the same powers to reject executory contracts
and leases as existed under the prior law. Section 3659 of the new Act
provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section,'" the trustee, subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor. . . , (d) (1) In a case under Chapter 7 of this title, if the
trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such ad8. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101). This Act is a complete recodification of federal bankruptcy law. Title I contains the substantive provisions, Title II sets forth the amendments
to Title 28 of the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence and primarily
is concerned with the changes in and composition of the bankruptcy courts, Title III
includes housekeeping amendments to provide consistency of terminology and crossreferences to other titles of the United States Code, and Title IV provides for the effective dates and the transaction period between the prior law and the 1978 Act. The
substantive provisions with which this article is concerned will become effective October 1, 1979. This article will refer to the Reform Act as either the new law or 1978
Act and, consistent with the new law's terminology, to the bankrupt as the debtor.
9. The 1978 Act § 365.
10. Sections 765 and 766 of the 1978 Act deal with commodity broker liquidations
and subsections (b) and (c) with limitations on the trustee's right to assume executory
contracts or unexpired leases and are largely inapposite to this article.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/8
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ditional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes,
then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
The right to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases set
forth in section 365(a) applies to liquidations,II to reorganizations,I2 to
adjustments of debts of a municipality' 3 and of an individual." The
trustee's right to reject applies to unexpired leases of personal as well
as real property.' 5 The statute applies whether the bankrupt is the

lessor or lessee. 16

-Section 365(h) provides some protection in the form of certain
rights for the lessee of real property in the event the trustee of the
bankrupt lessor rejects the lease:
(h)(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may
treat the lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may
remain in possession for the balance of the term of such lease and any
renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such lessee under
applicable nonbankruptcy law. (2) If such lessee remains in possession,
such lessee may offset against the rent reserved under such lease for the
balance of the term after the date of the rejection of such lease, and any
such renewal or extension, any damages occurring after such date caused
by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date,
but such lessee does not have any rights against the estate on account of
any damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such
offset. 7
Although the protective provision represents a substantial modification, the trustee's rejection right, as noted above, is basically
similar to the provisions of the prior law.'"
11. The 1978 Act §§ 701-766.
12. The 1978 Act §§ 1101-1174.
13. The 1978 Act § 901.
14.
15.

The 1978 Act §§ 1301-1330.
See 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

3.24[1] (14th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as 6

COLLIER].

16.

4A

See 4A

COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

70.44[1] (14th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as

COLLIER].

17. The 1978 Act § 365 (h)(1)-(2).
18. 11 U.S.C. § I10(b) (1938) (amended 1962); FED. R. BANKR. P. 607. The prior
law on rejection of executory contracts is set out in Bankruptcy Rule 607 and section
70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Rule 607. Assumption, Rejection, and Assignment of Executory Contracts.
Within 30 days after the qualification of the trustee, unless the court for cause
shown extends or reduces the time, the trustee shall file a statement showing anfy
executory contracts of the bankrupt, including unexpired leases, which the trustee
has assumed. Whenever practicable, the trustee shall obtain approval of the court
before he assumes a contract. Any such contract not assumed within 60 days after
qualification of the trustee, or within such further or reduced time as the court
Published by eCommons, 1979
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Under the new law, assumption of executory contracts requires
court approval and the "where practicable" qualification of the earlier
statute has been eliminated. Affirmative rejection also requires court

approval, but the automatic rejection if no action is taken during the
60 day period assumes court approval of that result.
The provisions in the new law dealing with protection of real property lessees in the event of the trustee's rejection of an unexpired lease
are substantially more elaborate and less ambiguous than earlier provisions. As before, the lessee's estate in the leased property will not be
disturbed for the balance of the lease. Clarifying an issue which was in
9
dispute under the prior law, the new law also protects the lessee's
right to renew or extend the lease term. Moreover, the lessee under section 365(h) of the new law has the option to treat the lease as terminated if the lessor's trustee rejects it. Alternatively, if the lessee remains in possession, it has the right under the new law to offset against
rent any damages occurring after rejection resulting from the nonper0
formance of any of the debtor lessor's lease obligations."

While clarifying certain issues, the 1978 Act does not address other
significant problems regarding the rejection of executory contracts and
unexpired leases. These include the issues of what constitutes an exmay allow within such 60-day period, shall be deemed to be rejected. If a trustee
does not qualify, any such contract shall be deemed to be rejected at the expiration of 60 days after the date of an order directing that a trustee be not appointed,
or at such earlier or later time as the court may fix within such 60-day period. On
application by the trustee for authority to assign any contract he has assumed pursuant to this rule, the court shall determine the matter after hearing on notice to
the other party to the contract.
11 U.S.C. § 110 (b) (amended 1962) provides in pertinent part:
Unless a lease of real property expressly otherwise provides, a rejection of the
lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the
lessee of his estate. A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be
assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at
his election and subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an
assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or
of either party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate the same shall be enforceable. A trustee who elects to assume a contract or
lease of the bankrupt and who subsequently, with the approval of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court may fix after hearing upon notice to
the other party to the contract or lease, assigns the contract or lease to a third person, is liable for breaches occurring after the assignment.
19. Prior to the 1978 Act, there was no definitive authority as to whether the
lessor's trustee could reject a renewal option exercisable by the lessee in its sole discretion. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the personal property lease context.
20. The reports of both the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary which
accompanied their respective versions of this bill state that the purpose of subsection
(h) was to ensure that the tenant would not be deprived of his estate for the term for
which he had bargained. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6 and H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3, 62.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/8
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ecutory contract or covenant which may be rejected by the trustee;
under what, if any, conditions a lease will be deemed an executed contract and thus not susceptible of rejection; and most importantly,
whether personal property lessees are entitled to any of the rights afforded real property lessees despite the fact that the protective provisions of subsection (h) are expressly limited to real property lessees.
These questions will be examined, and possible answers, and their implications for the lessee will be discussed.

III.
A.

RIGHT OF LESSOR'S TRUSTEE TO REJECT EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS

Executed and Executory Contracts Compared.

The unqualified wording of the statute that the trustee may reject
an unexpired lease, the prevailing view is that the trustee cannot disaffirm an unexpired lease which is fully executed. The most comprehen2
sive article to date on the lessor's bankruptcy ' concludes that the
trustee's right to reject a lease should arise only in situations in which
2
something remains to be done by the debtor under the lease." The rationale for this view is that the purpose of the right to reject is to allow
the estate of the debtor to avoid burdensome contracts or obligations
the performance of which would tend to diminish the value of the
estate for distribution to the debtor's creditors. The mere continuation
of the lessee's right to possession constitutes no such burden, provided
the lessee continues to pay rent, and there is nothing but uninterrupted
possession to be provided by the debtor's estate. This argument is summarized as follows:
The philosophy behind the right of rejection, that is, the need to abandon burdensome property. . . suggests that the right should apply only in
situations in which the covenant is executory on the part of the bankrupt.
In addition, there is good cause to believe that was the intent of the
statutory drafters. According to Collier, the purpose of Section 70b was
to solve the problem of assumption of liabilities of the bankrupt. Thus,
the statute gives the trustee the power to assume or reject the bankrupt's
obligations, but not to change the terms of the other party's duties. As a
practical matter, allowing the right to reject only if something remains to
be done under the contract by the bankrupt would seem to be the only
reasonable result, since it is difficult to conceive of a contract that would
be "burdensome" to his estate if nothing remains to be done by the
bankrupt.23
21. Creedon, supra note 3, at 1391.
22. Id. at 1403. Accord, 6 COLLIER, supra note 15, at 3.24.
23. Creedon, supra note 3, at 1397. The conclusion reached in the Creedon article
is corroborated by other authorities which have explored this subject. See, 4A COLLIER
Published by eCommons, 1979
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Although this analysis was made under section 70(b) of the prior
law, the provision for rejection by the trustee in the 1978 Act is virtually identical and, therefore, this rationale is equally valid under the new
law.
B. The Statutory Protection Given Real Property Lessees Should be
Judicially Extended to Lessees of Personal Property.
The rationale for distinguishing between executed and executory
contracts is equally applicable to the protective provisions of subsection (h) of the new law. The lessee's right to remain in possession
despite the trustee's rejection of the lease is based on the view that this
places no additional burden or drain on the estate. However, subsection (h) clearly applies only to real property leases and, in light of the
fact that equipment leasing was a widely used form for transacting
business during consideration of the new law by Congress, the argument that subsection (h) applies equally to personal property leases is
unpersuasive.
Nevertheless, the rationale for granting the real property lessee the
right to possession and use of the property applies also to the equipment lessee. A personal property lease is no more a burden to the
lessor's estate than a real property lease and, by assuring the payment
of rent for a fixed term to the lessor, it is equally an asset of the estate.
Moreover, the equipment lessee, who has made plans and committed
investment in reliance on the lease arrangement, is as entitled to protection as the real property tenant expressly protected by the statute. It
is submitted, therefore, that the lessee in an equipment lease transaction, either an operating or finance lease, should be entitled to the protection of subsection (h) as to its right to possession of the leased property. However, it will be accomplished through effective argument to
the bankruptcy court, and not by the certainty of a protective statute.
Finally, applying the burden/drain rationale to the few cases which
have involved the rejection of real property leases by trustees of the
lessors, courts have reasoned that the lease cannot be viewed as
creating a burden on the estate merely because the lease was a bad
bargain and more favorable rentals for the property would increase the
debtor's estate.24 In In re D.H. Overmyer Co., 5 which involved a
sublease of warehouse space, the trustee of the debtor sublessor sought
supra note 16, at

1404 nn.52 & 53.

1 70.44; Siegel, supra note 4, at 907-08. Cf. Creedon, supra note 3, at

24. See, e.g., In re D.H. Overmyer Co., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1 65,439
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N.Y. Rys. Co., 278 F. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1922). Contra, In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943).
25. 510 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975).
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to reject the lease under section 70(b) of the prior law on the grounds
that the rental was below the then current fair market rental value.2 6
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court held that the opportunity for
greater profit was no basis for rejection of the lease or renegotiation of
the rentals by the trustee and that the position of the sublessee who
relied on the agreed rental should not be prejudiced. The court held:
"Normally, executory contracts are rejected only when continued performance would create a drain on the debtor's assets for a purpose
which was no longer needed, and not when the contract was originally
a good bargain for the debtor but subsequently became less
favorable." 27
This reasoning is implicitly adopted in subsection (h) of the 1978
Act as evidenced by the legislative reports of both houses of Congress
that the rejection provision was intended to insure the lessee of his
estate for the term for which he bargained.2 8 Clearly the agreement on
the amount of rent for the term is the heart of the bargain.
While logically this rationale should apply to personal property
leases as well, one equipment leasing case involving such property permitted the trustee to renegotiate rentals. In In re Bermec Corp.29 ,
which involved the bankruptcy reorganization of a lessor of trucks, the
court approved a plan which included the favorable renegotiation of
the debtor lessor's rental agreement. In addition, one commentator has
reasoned that a renegotiation of rent is in fact a method of more
equitably allocating the loss among the lessor's creditors and the
lessee. 30 By adjusting the rental to have the lessee pay a greater amount
for performance of the lessor's executory convenants, disaffirmance of
the covenants could be avoided.'
Given this judical precedent and legal commentary, the equipment
lessee attempting to avoid rental renegotiation will undoubtedly be faced
with arguments by the trustee on this very important issue. Part IV of
this article will address these conflicting arguments in more depth. The
trustee's success will probably turn on the equities of the situation including the reasonableness of the rent and the ability of lessee's
counsel to persuade the court to accept the Overmyer rationale and to
26. Id. This was actually a case involving an assignment of the debts of the
sublessor and not a liquidation but the court held § 70(b) and the rejection provision
applicable to such proceedings.
27. Id.
28. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
29. 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971). See also In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.
Ga. 1943); Creedon, supra note 3, at 1411.
30. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 917.
31.

Id. at 913-16.
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make some reasonable accommodation between performance of the
lessor's executory covenants and a revised rental.
C. Rejection of Executory Covenants.
Although it is plain that the debtor lessor's trustee may reject
covenants requiring affirmative or executory acts to be performed
subsequent to the bankruptcy, the scope of the definition of "affirmative or executory covenants" which may be rejected has been the
subject of considerable debate.3 2 Writers agree that covenants of the
lessor to maintain or repair, or to furnish sevices to the lessee may be
disaffirmed by the trustee. 33 This view is consistent with the rationale
underlying the rejection of leases which are burdensome to the estate
and which require affirmative acts by the trustee.
In addition to the right to reject such service covenants, a recent
equipment leasing case held that the trustee may also reject a purchase
option provided in the lease. 3 ' The court in In re Olin applied section
70(b) of the prior law and found that the obligation of the lessor to
convey title to leased motor vehicles was an executory contract. This
case was consistent with an earlier decision involving real property in
which the putative purchaser, who had made a down payment on the
property, could not compel delivery of the deed from the trustee of the
seller who had become bankrupt before the scheduled closing. The
court found that the purchaser was subject to the trustee's right to reject the contract of sale.35 Since the reasoning in these cases is that the
right to reject is appropriately exercised when performance of the
covenants would entail a drain on the assets of the bankrupt estate's
assets, then covenants to pay taxes, provide insurance, rebuild damaged property or lease additional property would also presumably be
susceptible to rejection although these have not been the subject of any
case.
Interestingly enough, however, the 1978 Act overruled this line of
cases for putative purchasers in possession of real property in section
365(i)3 6:
32. See the extensive discussion of the various views and conflicting decisions on
this issue in both Silverstein, supra note 4, at 407 and Siegel, supra note 4, at 903.
33. See Creedon, supra note 3, at 1406-07; Siegel, supra note 4, at 908; Kane,
supra note 4, at 495. Compare Silverstein, supra note 4, at 489.
34. In re Olin of New York, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
35. In re N.Y. Inv. Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), 153 F. Supp.
772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. E. Neth. Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1958).
36. The 1978 Act § 365(i). Like section 365(h), there is no indication in the congressional reports as to why this provision was specifically limited to real property transactions.
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(i)(l) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale
of real property under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may
remain in possession of such real property.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession (A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such
contract, but may offset against such payments any damages occurring
after the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not have any rights against the estate on account of any
damages arising after such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with the
provisions of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform under such contract.
Although there are grounds for distinguishing the sale of realty
from the sale of goods, the enactment of subsection (i) should at least
lend support to the equipment lessee's argument that its purchase option should be enforced against the bankrupt estate. Alternatively, the
lessee, if it fails to persuade the court to enforce the option, should try
to argue for an adjustment of rent as in the Olin case. 3 7 In that case,
while the court upheld the trustee's right to reject the purchase option,
it also held that this rejection reduced the value of the lease to the
lessee and, therefore, the lessee was obligated only for the fair market
rental value of the leased equipment and not the reserved rental.38 The
lessee might also appeal more convincingly to the court's sense of equity if it can prove that the purchase price is fair or if it can show the expenditure of substantial funds on the leased equipment in reliance on
its purchase.39 The lessee under a finance lease might preserve its pur37. In re Olin of New York, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
38. This would be the result that Creedon and Zinman feel a bankruptcy court,
exercising its equitable powers, should reach. Creedon, supra note 3, at 1420, 1434.
It does not appear that Olin was a finance lease with the rentals assigned to a lender;
if that were the case, the court might have had greater difficulty in adjusting the rental
since another party (the assignee) would then have been injured. Further, the Olin case
rationale is that the trustee by rejecting any covenant of the lease breaches the lease in
its entirety. 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This view certainly has
some support, but it seems more accurate to state that the rejection of a lease comprehends the rejection of all executory covenants and not some of them. 6 COLLIER,
supra note 15, at 3.24. This rule would not seem to inhibit the trustee rejecting executory covenants while still insisting that the full rental be paid. See Siegel, supra note
4, at 11-12; Kane, supra note 4, at'495; Creedon, supra note 3, at 1419. Silverstein, in
his article, takes the contrary view that since the trustee has the power to reject all executory covenants, it may reject one or two. Sivlerstein, supra note 4, at 492.
39. This investment or reliance aspect may lie behind the distinction in the new
law that allows a putative purchaser in possession to compel the trustee to deliver title
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chase option if the assignee, rather than the lessor, has the right to
°
transfer title upon the lessee's exercise of its purchase option.
Another issue raised by the lack of definition of the term executory
covenant involves a renewal option provided to the lessee in the lease
agreement. Two cases involving real property leases are usually cited
for the proposition that the renewal right is part of the executed "leased conveyance" which cannot be rejected.' Section 365(h)(i) of the
1978 Act codifies this view by making it clear that a real property lessee
may remain in possession through any renewal term even if the trustee
rejects the lease. This provision of the 1978 Act is also consistent with
the position previously argued by most commentators that the renewal
option was part of the original estate demised to the lessee and that exercise of the option by the tenant imposed no burden or drain on the
assets of the bankrupt estate. 2
One writer had analyzed the issue of the rejection of renewal options by distinguishing the present demise and the contractual rights
theories. 3 If the court viewed the renewal option as part of the original
conveyance of the leasehold estate, it would not permit rejection of the
renewal option. If it perceived the option as a contract right in favor of
the lessee, it might permit rejection.
The view that the renewal option in a real property lease is a part
of the original demise should also be extended to equipment leases
since the rationale is equally applicable. However, since the new law
expressly refers only to real property leases, the lessee's counsel will
again have to be prepared to argue on the basis of cases decided under
the prior law. One difficulty counsel must anticipate is that the leading
case under prior law44 holding that the renewal option could not be rejected involved a ground lessee who had erected expensive structures
with the expectation that he could renew the lease for an additional 21
years. It is unlikely that the equities will so clearly favor the lessee in
but not the purchaser who is not in possession. The 1978 Act § 365(i)(2)(B).
Presumably, the additional hardship to the purchaser in possession of giving up property on which he may have already expended money or effort in part of the reason for
this distinction.
40. RIESMAN, supra note 1, at 615 n.67.
42. In re N.Y. Inv. Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), 153 F. Supp.
772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom., Cohen v. E. Neth. Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1958); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N.Y. Rys. Co., 278 F. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1922). Contra, Coy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 198 F. 275 (D. Ore.
1912).
42. Creedon, supra note 3, at 1411.
43. Jacobson, supra note 4, at 152.
44. In re N.Y. Inv. Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), 153 F. Supp.
772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. E. Neth. Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1958).
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the context of an equipment lease. Nevertheless, if the fixed renewal
rental is near the fair market rental value or if the renewal is to be
calculated at the fair market rental value at the time of renewal, the
lessee should be able to convince the bankruptcy court to enforce the
option. If the fixed rental for the option period turns out to be well
below the prevailing fair market rental value, however, the trustee's
argument that such a renewal would burden the estate might prevail.
IV.

AVOIDING THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LESSOR'S
BANKRUPTCY.

A. Operating Lease.
The consequences to the equipment lessee of the trustee's rejection
of the lessor's executory obligations under the lease are indeed
substantial. In the operating lease transaction, the lessor has most of
the important obligations of maintenance, repair, risk of loss in the
event of casualty, and payment of taxes. Because the lessor's trustee
has the right to reject such executory covenants, the equipment lessee
will have to assume performance of these obligations itself at substantial cost. In addition, the lessee's claim for breach of the lease may be
relegated to the status of an unsecured claim against the lessor's
estate. 5
This raises the very harsh possibility that the lessee, absent an offset clause in the lease, would still be liable for the full rental even
though it has lost the benefit of having the lessor perform these important covenants .46 The 1978 Act has alleviated this problem by providing in section 365(h)(2) that a real property lessee who remains in
possession after the trustee has rejected the lease "may offset against
the rent reserved under such lease ... any damages ... caused by the
non-performance of any obligation of the debtor . . . ."' The 1978
Act also permits the lessee to treat the real property lease as terminated
if the trustee of the lessor rejects the unexpired lease. Therefore, if the
45. The 1978 Act § 365(g).
46. The prevailing law in most jurisdictions is that the lessee's obligation for rental payments is an independent obligation which continues unabated even if the lessor
has breached certain of its covenants. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 911; Kane, supra
note 4, at 496. There are exceptions to this rule as when the non-performance of the
lessor's obligations amounts to constructive eviction in a residential property lease or
where, by statute, offset by the lessee against rent is permitted. See N.Y. REAL PROP.
AcTs. § 755(3) (1977). There are, in addition, a number of cases which have permitted
offset by the lessee but not usually in a commercial lease transaction. Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 1341 (1970). However, the right to abatement is unlikely to be extended to
an equipment lease by most courts, particularly in -a commercial situation.
47. The 1978 Act § 365(h)(2). This explicit right provided the lessee was not
available under the prior law.
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lessee can lease similar premises elsewhere or no longer really needs the
8
premises, it can avoid this undesirable situation.
Once again, these statutory rights are expressly limited to real
estate lessees. There is substantial equity in the argument of an equipment lessee that it too should be permitted to offset against rent the
9
value of the rejected convenants.1 Nevertheless, an argument can be
made that permitting offset is contrary to the policy of the rejection
provision of the bankruptcy act to maximize the debtor's estate and

permit an equal distribution of the estate to the many claimants and
creditors who have incurred losses as a result of the bankruptcy."

Even if personal property lessees are unsuccessful in convincing
bankruptcy courts to extend to them the protections provided by
statute to real property lessees, they can achieve many of the same
benefits through careful drafting and negotiation of their leases.
An equipment lessee with some economic leverage in an operating
lease situation should attempt to persuade the lessor to include in the
lease a termination clause providing the equipment lessee with the option to terminate the lease if the lease is rejected by the lessor's
trustee.' In addition, the lessee should endeavor to negotiate a provi-

sion that in the event of non-performance of certain covenants by the
48. The 1978 Act § 365(h)(1). This again is further protection for the lessee which
was not provided under the prior law.
49. Creedon and Zinman argued several years prior to the new act that if the
trustee rejects executory obligations of the lessor, the lessee should be able to either
cancel the lease or petition the court for a rent reduction. Creedon, supra note 3, at
1434.
50. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 908, 910-11. The argument is made that as harsh
as the result is to the lessee, it is consistent with the policy of the bankruptcy act not to
compel the lessor to perform a burdensome obligation or to permit his estate to be
diminished by allowing the lessee to offset against rental payments. It is further contended that such a result leaves the lessee in the same position as other parties to contracts with the debtor which have been rejected. Kane, supra note 4, at 496. However,
as Siegel also points out in his article, the lessee will be at a greater financial disadvantage in that it must continue to pay the full rental if it desires to continue the lease.
Siegel, supra note 4, at 912. In effect, a bankruptcy court refusing to allow an abatement of rent by the lessee when the trustee has disaffirmed the debtor lessor's executory obligations is permitting a renegotiation of the lease rental.
51. Under the new law, a clause that automatically provides for termination of
the lease upon the insolvency or filing for liquidation of the other party will not be enforced. The 1978 Act § 365(e)(1). Therefore, if the trustee is willing to assume the
lease, provided he complies with the requirements of section 365 relating to assumption, no clause in the lease providing for termination can prevent him. This is in sharp
distinction to the prior law which specifically provided that clauses terminating a lease
in the event of bankruptcy were enforceable. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1938). However, if
the trustee elects to disaffirm the lease, then it would seem clear that a clause in the
lease permitting termination would be given effect. As stated, this right to terminate in
the event of rejection by the trustee is extended by the new statute to real property
lessees.
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lessor, the lessee may abate its rental obligations. A more limited
abatement clause could provide for rental credits in the event the leased
equipment fails to work or might permit the lessee to apply a portion
of the rentals to pay for performance by the lessee or someone else of
the lessor's covenants." With the termination or right to offset clauses
in the lease, the risks to the lessee caused by the lessor's bankruptcy
would be substantially diminished.
B. Finance Lease
The consequences of the lessor's bankruptcy and the trustee's rejection of the executory covenants of the lessor are even more substantial for the finance lessee of personal property. The lessee's rental
obligation in a finance or leverage lease is directly to the assignee of the
lessor's interest in the equipment and is usually unconditional, despite
any rights to rent abatement or offset to which the lessee might be entitled against the lessor." Therefore, even if the lessee could successfully argue that the protective provisions of section 365(h) should apply to
equipment lessees, the right to offset rentals in subsection (h)(2) would
not be available to the finance lessee. Furthermore, the fact that the
lender-assignee in a finance lease looks to the credit of the lessee
precludes any provision in the lease which would permit the lessee to
terminate the lease in the event of the lessor's bankruptcy." '
Therefore, so long as the assignee has not disturbed the lessee's
possession and use of the leased property, the lessee's obligation for
the full lease rental will not be abated even if important executory
covenants are disaffirmed by the trustee unless the lessee can convince
the bankruptcy court to fashion a more equitable result.5 5 A mitigating
factor, however, is that the finance lease will normally be a net lease
transaction with most of the obligations relating to use, maintenance,
repair, taxes, insurance and risk of loss of the equipment on the lessee.
If these obligations are directly the responsibility of the lessee, then the
lessor's bankruptcy will really have little effect on the lessee in these
areas. But if the payments for certain of these obligations are made as
52. These remedies, which would be applicable in non-bankruptcy situations in
which the lessor has breached its covenants, may, by virtue of their specificity and circumscribed application, be more palatable to the lessor.
53. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
54. The assignee in fact relies exclusively on the flow of rentals under the lease
and the leased property as security for its loan to the lessor or equity participant, which
debt is usually without recourse. See REISMAN, supra note 1, at 105-07.
55. This issue will be addressed shortly, but the disposition, or even the power, of
the bankruptcy court to ameliorate the lessee's position may not be substantial in such
a situation since the assignee has done nothing to disturb the lessee's possession and
would have a good claim for the full rental.
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additional rent or are part of the unconditional payment to the lessor,
who in turn pays the insuror or taxing authority, the payments could
possibly be held to be assets of the debtor lessor's estate, and the covenant of the lessor to make the payment could be disaffirmed. 6 Alternatively, if the lessee has the obligation to provide or pay for insurance, but the lessor the obligation to repair or replace damaged
equipment, the lessee may be substantially injured if the lessor's
bankruptcy is coupled with damage to the leased equipment.
Counsel for the finance lessee may, by thoughtful planning, avoid
the risks of the lessor's bankruptcy in these areas. It would be desirable
to include in the lease clauses providing that the lessee is directly
responsible for all obligations such as maintenance, insurance, taxes,
and risk of loss. If this is not workable because the lessor or lender
desires assurance that the taxes and insurance will be paid, then the
lessee should be certain that such payments are not denominated as
rent and that they are paid into escrow where they will not be considered part of the debtor lessor's estate."
There are, however, certain covenants which under virtually all circumstances will be imposed on the lessor even in a finance lease.
Among these is the obligation to provide additional integral components for the leased equipment or upgrades in the case of computer
equipment. In many cases, it will be desirable to fix the rate at which
the lessor will lease the additional equipment. This commitment may
be essential if the addition is an integral part of the original equipment.
The obligation to lease additional equipment is clearly executory, requiring affirmative action and expenditure by the lessor, and consequently is subject to rejection by the trustee. To protect itself in this
situation, the lessee should ensure that the additions clause of the lease
permits it the right to lease or purchase additional components and add
them to the original equipment without the lessor's permission.
The finance lease may also include options to renew or to purchase." The discussion in Part III of this article indicated that it remains at best uncertain whether the equipment lessor's trustee can re56. See Kane, supra note 4, at 496.
57. See, e.g., Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 405 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
Creel v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 383 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
58. These options will also commonly be included in the operating lease. The
discussion concerning the renewal options would apply equally to the finance and the
operating type lease. With respect to purchase options, the issue of the bankruptcy
trustee's right to reject also applies to both types of leases. However, the concern will
normally be greater in the finance lease because the lessee will, during the lease term,
normally have paid out in rental the entire acquisition cost of the leased equipment,
and, applying a portion of these payments as rental credits, the purchase option price
may be well below the market price of such equipment.
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ject the lessee's renewal option. Thus the lessee would be well advised
to include a renewal option clause which makes it clearly part of the
original demise. Similarly, as noted in Part III the lessee might attempt
to preserve its purchase option in the event of the lessor's bankruptcy
by requiring that the assignee, rather than the lessor, be empowered to
transfer title to the property upon exercise of the option. While such a
provision could conceivably avoid the problem of rejection by the
lessor's trustee, this writer has never come across such a clause. The
lessor's trustee could still argue that exercise of the purchase option
would constitute a burden on the estate in that it would deprive the
estate of the equipment's residual value.
Both the operating and the finance lessee face the risk of the
trustee attempting to renegotiate the rental. The right to possession of
the equipment at the agreed upon rental clearly involves no burden on
the debtor's estate, and the view that renegotiation is not part of the
trustee's rejection power is supported by at least one case and several
commentators. 59 On the other hand, there is no statutory prohibition
on such power, and in the Bermec case discussed earlier"0 , renegotiation of rentals was allowed as part of the rehabilitation plan of an
equipment lessor.
In this situation, the finance lessee may have one argument not
available to the operating lessee. The rentals in a finance lease are
structured to repay principal and interest of the loan made by the
assignee to the lessor." To that extent, the rentals are like chattel mortgage payments and, so long as there is no default, the trustee of the
lessor has little basis to upset the transaction. " On the other hand, an
operating lessee's rentals are based solely on fair market rental value.
The operating lessee may thus find itself confronted with a strong
equitable argument from the trustee that the original rental is much
lower than the current fair market rental value and should be adjusted
upwards.
59. In re D.H. Overmyer Co., BANKR. L.
See also, Creedon, supra note 3, at 1411-12.
60. 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
61.

REISMAN, supra note 1, at 106.

REP.

(CCH) 65,439 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

62. The thrust of this argument is that the lessor in a finance lease is analogous to
a party with a security interest, who either in bankruptcy or in a plan for reorganization, cannot alter the interest rates or payments of principal required to be paid by the
debtor (analogous to the finance lessee) pursuant to the note. See Creedon, supra note
3, at 1405. This reasoning, however, is contrary to Bermec which also involved leases
which were assigned to a lender but in which the court, nevertheless, sanctioned
renegotiation of rentals while, at the same time, reducing the debt payments from the
debtor lessor to the secured parties. See discussion of this case in REISMAN, supra note
1, at 630.
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There is one other area of concern which the lessor's bankruptcy
poses for the equipment lessee under a finance lease-whether the
lessee might face conflicting claims for the equipment or the rentals
from both the lessor's trustee and the assignee. The most drastic situation for the lessee would be one in which the trustee disaffirms the
lease and seeks to recover the leased property while the lessee remains
liable for rent to the lender-assignee on the basis of the lessee's unconditional undertaking to pay. This situation is fortunately unlikely to
arise. The prevailing view is that the trustee's right to reject does not
encompass the right to compel surrender of the leased property since
3
nothing remains to be done by the lessor. While this argument should
protect the equipment lessee, a zealous trustee might attempt to
recover the leased property free of the lease on the basis that his rejec64
tion right is absolute by virtue of section 365(a) and that the protec65 applies only to real estate
tion of the lessee's estate by section 365(h)
lessees.
The statement that the lessee is not likely to be faced with this
dilemma, however, is based on the fact that in a finance lease, the
security agreement between the lessor and the assignee normally involves the granting of a security interest in the leased equipment and
an assignment to the lender-assignee of the lease, including the right to
receive the rentals. If the assignee's rights in the equipment are
and
perfected, the assignee will have the prior right to the equipment
6 6 The trustee
bankruptcy.
in
trustee
lessor's
the rentals as against the
could not invalidate the assignee's interest in the equipment and lease
rentals since the granting of a security interest by the lessor to the
assignee is an executed coveyance which cannot be rejected by the
lessor's trustee.6 7 As long as the lessee is not in default, the assignee,
pursuant to a Consent to Assignment in which the assignee recognized
63. For a discussion of this issue and authorities cited, see notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
64. The 1978 Act § 365(a).
65. The 1978 Act § 365(h).
66. REISMAN, supra note 1, at 616; Feldman v. Nat'l Bank of N. America, 511
F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank, 368 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 511 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1975). This rule of the prior right of the
perfected secured party against the lessor does not extend to reorganization proceedings. In the Bermec case, for instance, the bankruptcy court, exercising its
equitable powers, required the rentals to be paid to the debtor lessor's estate as part of
the rehabilitation plan instead of the assignees of the leases to whom the rentals were
being paid directly. 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971). The lessee's position was not
jeopardized in that case since the court ordered the rental payments to be made to the
lessor's estate and, thus, any obligation of the lessee to pay the rental to the assignee
was cancelled as part of the court's approval of the reorganization plan.
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the lessee's leasehold interest, may not disturb the right of the lessee to
possession and use of the equipment. Therefore, since the assignee has
a superior right to the equipment and since the assignee is obligated
not to disturb the lessee's possession, the lessee should have continued
use of the equipment (albeit potentially without the performance of
possibly valuable executory covenants of the lessor) in return for payment of the full rental.6 8 This protection for the lessee is dependent on
the lending institution taking the appropriate steps to perfect its security interest in both the leased equipment and lease.
In certain instances, however, even sophisticated lenders acting in
their own self-interest fail to perfect their interest. Such was the situation in a line of cases involving the bankruptcy of Leasing Consultants,
Inc. (LCI). 9 LCI, involved in the leasing of aircraft, went bankrupt
after assigning security interests in the leased equipment and the leases
to large New York banks. In the Leasing Consultants case, the bank
failed to perfect its interest in the leased equipment by filing in the proper jurisdiction and, in the Feldman cases, the banks failed to perfect
their interests in the lease and the lease rentals by failing to file the
assignment of the lease. The result in each case was that LCI's trustee
in bankruptcy assumed the status of a hypothetical lien creditor 0 and
had a prior right to the proceeds of the sale of the leased equipment in
Leasing Consultants and a prior right to the lease rentals in Feldman.
In neither of the LCI cases was the lessee faced with competing claims
on its rent obligation. In Leasing Consultants, the lessee filed a
Chapter XI petition, and the leased property was reclaimed. In the
Feldman cases, the adjudication as to whether the trustee or the
assignee was entitled to the rentals was made after the expiration of the
lease and the payment of the rentals by the lessee to the assignee. Based
on these cases, however, it is conceivable that the lessee could be faced
with apparently valid claims for rent from both the trustee and the
assignee who failed to perfect his security interest and thus with the
prospect of litigation in the bankruptcy court or an interpleader action.
68. The agreement by the assignee not to disturb the lessee's possession of the
leased equipment would not have any effect on the lessee's situation with regard to the
rejection of the executory covenants of the lessor since these obligations are not assumed
by the assignee.
69. Feldman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 368 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank, 368 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 511 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1975). In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).

70. The 1978 Act § 544 provides that the trustee has the status of a lien creditor as
of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. This is the successor to section 70(c) of
the prior law (11 U.S.C. § 110(c)(1938) under which the LCI cases were decided.
Published by eCommons, 1979

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:2

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The issues raised by an equipment lessor's bankruptcy and the
possible risks to the equipment lessee discussed in this article must be
viewed in the context of the policies underlying the bankruptcy
statutes. The nature of bankruptcy, where by definition there are insufficient assets to satisfy all the lessor's obligations, places upon the
bankruptcy court the unenviable responsibility of resolving the competing claims of unsatisfied parties. Inevitably, the result will involve
some economic injury to those who have had the misfortune to deal
with the debtor. Accordingly, planning to avoid the consequences and
to limit the risk for the equipment lessee of the lessor's bankruptcy is
extremely difficult.
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides no
special protection for equipment lessees. The Act's failure to include
lessees of personal property in its protective provisions not only leaves
the lessee dependent on limited and conflicting precedent but it also
gives the trustee the argument of negative implication that, by omitting
any reference to lessees of personal property, the 1978 Act indicates a
Congressional intent to exclude equipment lessees from those protections granted real property lessees. The new law also leaves uncertain
questions as to which executory covenants may be rejected by the
lessor's trustee and whether the trustee may seek a renegotiation of the
rent. It is proposed here that bankruptcy courts through their equitable
powers extend to equipment lessees the same protections now afforded
real property lessees by law, where the rationale for such protection is
the same. It is also suggested that the courts fashion innovative and
equitable remedies such as reducing rental when executory covenants
are rejected.
It is the immediate responsibility of lessee's counsel to take steps
during the drafting and negotiation stages to protect the lessee in the
event of the lessor's bankruptcy. In an operating lease, the lessee
should insist on the right to terminate if the lessor's trustee fails to
assume the lessor's duties or if they are not assumed by the lessor in a
reorganization plan. If possible, the lessee in an operating lease should
obtain a provision permitting it to offset rentals at least to a limited extent in the event of a breach of the lessor's covenants. In a finance
lease, any consent to assignment of the lease or the equipment should
be conditioned on the assignee's agreement to either subordinate its interest to the lessee's or not to disturb the lessee's possession and use of
the equipment if there is no default. In addition, the lessee should try
to ensure that, since it has the economic obligations of ownership such
as maintenance, repair, taxes, insurance and risk of loss, it also has conhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss2/8
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trol over the payment for or performance of such obligations, and that
payments for such items not be denominated as rent. Although protecting itself fully from the possible rejection of renewal and purchase options or the threat of rental renegotiation or competing rental claims is
difficult, the lessee can, by careful drafting and negotiation, minimize
the adverse consequences of the lessor's bankruptcy and the trustee's
power to reject executory contracts and covenants.
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